Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Allen R. Grahn and Josephine M. Grahn, husband
and wife v. Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on
behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the
Albert Eccles Family Trust, Dean Bradshaw and
Christi Bradshaw : Amended Reply Brief of
Appellant Gregory
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert M. Taylor; John s. Adams; Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents.
Jeffrey K. Woodbury; Russll S. Walker; Woorbury, Jensen, Kesler & Swinton; Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Grahn v. Gregory, No. 890340 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1942

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
h FU
5U
.A10
DOCKET NO.

ffi^SSO CA

III TOIB COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Case No. 89-0340 CA
vs.
Argument Priority No. 14(b)
HEROLD L. GREGORY, TRUSTEE,
for and on behalf of the
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF
THE ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY
TRUST, DEAN BRADSHAW and
CHRISTI BRADSHAW,

District Court No. C-86-8833
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants/Appellants.
AMENDED REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT GREGORY
Appeal from a Final Order of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable John A. Rokich
Robert M. Taylor, #3208
John S. Adams, #A0017
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 263-1112

Russell S. Walker, #3363
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

Jeffrey K. Woodbury, #4172
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Gregory
2677 East Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: (801) 485-6963

FILED
JUL 2 5 1990

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Case No. 89-0340 CA
vs.
Argument Priority No. 14(b)
HEROLD L. GREGORY, TRUSTEE,
for and on behalf of the
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF
THE ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY
TRUST, DEAN BRADSHAW and
CHRISTI BRADSHAW,

District Court No. C-86-8833
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants/Appellants.
AMENDED REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT GREGORY
Appeal from a Final Order of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable John A. Rokich
Robert M. Taylor, #3208
John S. Adams, #A0017
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 263-1112

Russell S. Walker, #3363
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

Jeffrey K. Woodbury, #4172
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Gregory
2677 East Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: (801) 485-6963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1

INTRODUCTION

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

4

ARGUMENT

15

I.

THERE WAS ONLY ONE MISTAKE MADE BY THE PARTIES TO
THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS BASED
UPON AN ERRONEOUS SURVEY
15

II.

THERE HAS BEEN NO CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS
IN THIS CASE
20

III. REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE REMEDY

23

IV.

THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION IS APPROPRIATE

23

V.
VI.

REFORMATION IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS WERE MERGED INTO
THE DEED BECAUSE THE PARTIES MADE THEIR
MISTAKES ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY
DURING THEIR BARGAINING, NOT WHILE REDUCING
THEIR BARGAIN TO WRITING

29

VII. THE DEED WAS CLEAR AND EVEN IF IT COULD BE
FOUND TO BE UNCLEAR, THE PAROLE EVIDENCE SHOWED
THAT THE DEED REFLECTED BOTH THE PLAINTIFFS' AND
DEFENDANTS ' INTENT

30

31

VIII. IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR RESPONDENTS IN THEIR BRIEF,
TO REASSERT THEIR ARGUMENT FOR DISMISSAL OF BRADSHAWS'
APPEAL WHEN THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE THEIR MOTION AND
IT HAS BEEN DENIED
33
IX.

BRADSHAWS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS AND THEREFORE CUT
OFF DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO REFORMATION
33

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

34

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359 (Vt. 1987)

20,29

Briggs v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985)

25

Neelev v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979)

31

Treatises
RESTATEMENT 2ND OF CONTRACTS SECTION 152 (1)

24

Equity, Bobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1954

23

Rules
Rule 24 (i), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

22

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Summary of Appellant'; Argument was fully set forth in
Appellant's first brief and is adopted herein by reference-

Comes now Defendant/Appellant Harold L. Gregory, Trustee,
for and on behalf of the Martial and Family Trusts of the Albert
Eccles Family Trust (hereinafter "Defendant/Appellant Gregory",
"Defendant Gregory", "Defendant", and/or "Gregory"), by and
through his attorney Jeffrey K. Woodbury in reply and in rebuttal
to the brief of Plaintiffs/Respondents Allen R. Grahn and
Josephine M. Grahn, husband and wife (hereinafter "Plaintiffs/
Respondents Grahn", "Plaintiffs Grahn", "Plaintiffs" and
"Grahns") .
INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Gregory submits this brief to clarify
his argument on the issues presented by Plaintiffs/ Respondents
Grahn. It is Grahns' position that the facts set forth in the
briefs of Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn and Defendants/Appellants
Bradshaw and Defendant/ Appellant Gregory clearly established
that a mutual mistake occurred when all parties relied upon a
survey prepare by Defendant McNeil.
Fact found this mistake to exist.

The Court in its Findings of

The Court chose to remake or

reform the contract between Defendant/Appellant Gregory and
Plaintiffs/ Respondents Grahn, chose to rescind the contract
between Defendant/Appellant Gregory and Defendants/Appellants
Bradshaw and left the issue between Defendant/Appellant Gregory
and Defendant McNeil to be decided at a future date or settled
between the parties.

Unfortunately, none of the parties in this

case was happy with the Court's

decision.

2

The

rlaintiffs/Respondents Grahn felt that they should not have to
pay for the additional property that they had received as a
result of this mistake.

Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw felt that

they should have received the deed to their specific parcel of
property despite the existence of the road and are unsatisfied
with the recision.

Defendant McNeil recognizing an error,

doesn't feel that his description was prepared for the benefit of
Defendant/Appellant Gregory, the Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw
and the Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn.

In any event, as a result

of everybody's unhappiness, the Defendant/Appellant Gregory has
to appeal the decision of the District Court in an effort to
completely rescind the transaction and start over without making
the errors based on mutual mistake that they made in the
transactions at issue in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(In Reply to Respondents' Brief,
"Statement of the Case", Section A)
Defendant Gregory objects to the statement made by
Plaintiffs Grahn in their Statement of the Case, Section A, that
"The Private Drive had been represented, intended and agreed to
be situated thereon, but mistakenly was not included in the legal
description."

This is Plaintiffs Grahn's argument in a nutshell

and is not a statement of the case.

Defendant Gregory seeks to

show in their appeal that the Trial Court erred in its decision
for reformation because the parties' intentions in making the
contract in the first place were based on mistaken assumptions

3

and that this was not merely a case of mistake in a legal
description which did not reflect the intentions of the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT
TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Reply to Respondents' Brief,
"Statement of the Case, Section B)
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn have objected to the facts
which Defendant Gregory set forth in his brief which cited to a
document on record in this case entitled "Stipulated Facts".
The attorneys for all the parties signed the Stipulation and
it is part of the record herein.

Plaintiffs'/Respondents'

attorney contends in their brief that the Stipulation was to be
used for the preliminary injunction hearing only, and that the
Trial Court, in its Order Granting Injunction, "acknowledged the
limited purpose for the Stipulation".

The Order stated only that

the Court had received a written Stipulation of Facts "setting
forth stipulated facts for the purposes of this hearing".

It did

not say, "for the limited purposes of this hearing" or "for the
purposes of this hearing only", or that the document was not to
be used again.

Further, Plaintiffs/Respondents objected to the

use of that document in their objection to the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, but the Court did not respond to that
objection in its Order denying that Motion.

Defendant Gregory

believes that the Stipulation of Facts, and thus the facts they
set forth in their brief citing to it, are not inconsistent with
the evidence and the rest of the record as to the relevant facts
of this case.

However, to eliminate as much confusion to the
4

Court as possible, we further clarify and support the relevant
facts as follows:
1.

In 1930, Albert and Carolyn Eccles acquired by deed a

parcel of property known as the "Brookburn property".
(Transcript, p. 416, L. 1-10)
2.

In 1960 or 1961, Carolyn Eccles and her husband Albert

divided the property and deeded part of that land, retaining
approximately 1.67 acres. The Trust is not aware of any requests
made during that time to legally subdivide the property.
(Transcript, p. 417, L. 16-20; p, 288, 289)
3.

In 1978, the Eccles conveyed the property to Harold L.

Gregory, Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and Family
Trust of the Albert L. Eccles Family.

(Transcript, p. 286, L. 4-

7; p. 287, L. 7-9)
4.

In 19 84, Defendant Gregory divided the existing 1.67

acre parcel of land at 2811 Brookburn Road to create two separate
contiguous parcels so that Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of
the Trust, could build a home on the smaller parcel being divided
off.

The Defendant Gregory hired Scott McNeil of McNeil

Engineering ("Defendant McNeil") to survey the property and
divide it into separate parcels.

(Transcript, p. 289, L. 16-20;

p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L. 5)
5.

Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the Trust,

instructed Defendant McNeil to do a topographic survey to divide
off and create a buildable parcel of at least one-half acre
(hereinafter "Parcel 2") in the southeast corner off the
5

driveway, using the driveway as a boundary. (Transcript, p. 222,
L. 7-21; p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3; p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L.
10)
6.

Mr. McNeil understood and was instructed that Defendant

Gregory intended for him to divide off an available lot,
consisting of at least one-half acre with the driveway as the
boundary.
7.

(Transcript, p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3)
In instructing McNeil, Defendant Gregory intended for

Parcel 2 to contain at least one-half acre because of zoning
requirements in that area that required a one-half acre parcel in
order to build. (Transcript, p. 300, L. 11-15; p. 422, L. 20-23)
8.

When McNeil Engineering did the physical survey, they

made an error with their instruments while separating off the
one-half acre parcel.
9.

(Transcript, p. 227 - 228)

Consequently, the written survey conformed with the

intentions of the parties, showing the southeast side of the
driveway to be a boundary (thus making the driveway part of the
1.11 acre Parcel 1), and showing Parcel 2 to contain .56 acre.
(See Survey, Exhibit 1-P of Record, Addendum A hereto)
10.

Since Defendant McNeil had made a mistake while doing

the physical survey, the written survey had incorporated that
mistake and even though the survey showed the driveway on Parcel
1, in reality it was within the confines of Parcel 2.

(See

Survey, Exhibit 19-D of record, which was the correct survey
later done of both parcels).
11.

Defendant Gregory represented to the Grahns that a
6

half-acre parcel had been separated off by survey, and that they
could either purchase the entire piece as one parcel, or they
could just purchase the one-acre parcel.

(Transcript, p. 57, L.

2-9)
12.

While showing the property to prospective buyers,

Gregory, through his agent, Noel Taylor, represented that the
property could be purchased in one parcel for $345,000.00 or
could be separated according to the survey stakes and sold as two
parcels, for approximately $270,000.00 for Parcel 1 and
approximately $75,000.00 for Parcel 2.

(Transcript p. 27, L. 23-

p. 28 L. 2; p. 45, L. 5-14)
13.

The Grahns decided they could not afford the whole

parcel, so they submitted an Earnest Money Agreement to Defendant
Gregory on Parcel 1 with a first right of refusal on Parcel 2.
That agreement was prepared by Grahns' attorney. (Transcript, p.
59, L. 19-25; p. 99, L. 12-17; p. 7, L. 16-24; Exh. 2-P of
record; Transcript, p. 113, L. 22- p. 114 L. 20)
14.

At the time the Defendant Gregory contracted with

Grahns to sell Parcel 1, the Defendant Gregory did not intend to
convey more acreage to the Grahns than he did convey by his
contract, yet his representation to Grahns that the driveway was
included with Parcel 1 was based on his erroneous assumption,
while relying on the survey, that the driveway was situated
within the 1.11 acre parcel which he were conveying. (Transcript,
p. 208, L. 20 - p.209, L. 11; p. 300, L. 18 - p. 301, L. 9)
15.

The Grahns relied on the placement of the survey
7

boundary stakes which had been placed in error, as well as on the
representations of the Defendant Gregory, based on that same
survey, in believing that they were purchasing a 1.11 acre parcel
of land which contained the driveway. (Transcript, p. 56, L. 22p. 57, L. 9; p. 86, L. 8-13; p. 139)
16.

When Grahns and Defendant Gregory and Mary Ethyl

Gregory negotiated their contract, they were all relying on the
erroneous survey. (Transcript, p. 94 L. 8-13)

Mrs. Grahn

testified she was relying on that survey even with the first
offer they made.

(Transcript, p. 97, L. ,18-21)

17. Defendant Gregory on behalf of the Trust intended to
divide the property into two parcels and intended that the
driveway remain with the parcel containing the house. However,
his decision to divide the property at all times was based on the
survey which showed he had a buildable, .56 acre parcel southeast
of the driveway.

Had he known this was a mistaken assumption, he

never would have divided the property, and so would never have
made this contract to sell Grahns Parcel 1 separately.
(Transcript, p. 209, L. 5-11; p. 209, L. 1-4; p. 301, L. 17-21;
p. 422, L. 10-23; p. 316, L. 5-17)
18.

Grahns were told that the division of the property was

based on the survey.

(Transcript, p. 94, L. 8-13)

The Grahns

were conscious of the division of the property during their
negotiations because they could not afford the entire piece.
(Transcript p. 99, L. 12-17)
19.

Defendant McNeil prepared a legal description of Parcel
8

2 as part of his survey of Parcel 2.

(Transcript, p. 419, L. 18-

21; p. 452, L. 24 - p. 453, L. 20).
20.

On or about March 18, 1986, Grahns and Defendant

Gregory entered into an Earnest Money Agreement for the purchase
of Parcel 1, consisting of 1.11 acres.

The amount of acreage

they were purchasing appeared twice on the agreement, once on the
first page of the document and once in the legal description
attached to it.

Their agreement also included (1) an option to

Grahns of first right of refusal on Parcel 2 (referred to five
times in the option as the "one-half acre" parcel), and (2) for a
15-foot restrictive aesthetic and geologic easement on Parcel 2
across the 15 feet nearest the driveway. (See Earnest Money
Agreement, Exhibit 2-P of Record)
21.

The Trial Court found that 1.11 acres was the acreage

which both Grahns and Gregory accepted as that which was being
bought and sold.

(Findings of Fact No. 13; Record p. 534)

22. Grahns accepted the existing survey upon purchasing
Parcel 1.

Mrs. Grahn testified that at one point she did request

a survey from Mrs. Gregory, but it was not at a time when she
could get it, and after that Mrs. Grahn did not worry about
getting a copy because the survey stakes were clearly laid out.
(Transcript, p. 303, L. 1-8; p. 82, L. 15-19; p. 139)
23.

Grahns wanted a warranty by Defendant Gregory that the

property was legally divided.

Defendant Gregory had been

receiving tax notices and paying taxes on the parcels separately
for two years and understood that to mean the land was legally
9

divided, and thus made the warranty that, based upon his
knowledge of the coui 11:y i:ecoi:ds , 11 ie J ai 1 d was 1 ega 1 1 y d I vIded .
(Transcript, p. 190, L. 5 - p
24.

191, L. 3)

Josephine Grahn obtained the legal description for

Parcel 1 from the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which legal
description the County presumably prepared from the legal
description McNeil prepared for Parcel 2.
25.

(Transcript, p, 84)

Oi i or about August 1, 19 86, Grahns and Defendant

Gregory closed on the transaction for the se;e of Parcel 1.
(Transcript
26•

-.

rjj, ii. z3 - p. 64, L, .

The legal description for Parcel 1 contained no calls

to the driveway.

(Transcript, p. 465, T. 3-7)

27 . Tl iere "was no overl ap i n til <

*ed ^ascriptions for

Parcels 1 and 2. (Transcript, p. 239, L. 1-5; p. 327, L, 1-13; p.
197, L. 4-10)
28-

On September J, ] 986, Defendants B-adshd* entered into

an Earnest Money Agreement with the Defendant Gregory to purchase
Parcel 2.
29.

(See Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 7-P of Record)
On September I, 1986, Defendant Gregory gave written

notice to Grahns of his intention to sell Parcel 2 to Bradshaws,
and extended the right of first refusal.

(See Exhibit ~-P of

Record)
30.

Grahns did not exercise their right of first refusal to

purchase Parcel ? ,, ti\w\ when the option expired, Grahns told
Defendant Gregory to go ahead with the Bradshaw sale.
(Transcript, p. ISf

L. 21 - p. 70, L. 9)
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31.

Bradshaws relied on McNeil's survey in tendering their

September 1, 19 86 offer which was accepted by Gregory after
Grahns failed to exercise their option to purchase Parcel 2.
(Transcript, p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 20; p. 397, L. 21 - p.
398, L. 15)
32.

After Grahns received notice of the Bradshaws' offer

and before their option expired, Josephine Grahn contacted
Christi Bradshaw by phone and informed her that it looked as if
Grahns were not going to be able to exercise their option, but
informed Christi Bradshaw that before building on Parcel 2,
Bradshaws would need to subdivide the property because it was not
legally subdivided.
33.

(Transcript, p. 375)

Shortly thereafter Defendant Gregory and Defendants

Bradshaw applied for and went through the subdivision process for
Parcel 2 and the subdivision was approved. (Transcript, p. 410,
L. 1-8; p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 9; p. 167, L. 20 -p. 168, L.
3)
34.

Salt Lake County Zoning ordinances require parcels of

land to contain at least one half acre in the zone in which the
property in question is located.

If Parcel 2 is left with less

than one-half acre, buildability is also questionable because of
the grade and terrain.

The owner would have to apply to the

Zoning and Planning Commission for a variance, if the Defendant
Gregory is left with less than a half acre, and there is no
guarantee a variance would be granted.

In fact, it took a long

time for Zoning to approve a permit for Bradshaws' existing house
11

plan on the property because of the Zoning Commissions' concern
over the steepness of the slope on the property,
264, L. 1-25; p. 265, L. 1 -15; p. 268, I
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(Transcript, p.

p. 269, L. 2; p.

185, L. 22 • 186, L. 6)
35.

i . October 1] , ] 9 86, Dean Bradshaw discovered by

measurement on Parcel 2 that the driveway was apparently not
located where indicated and was instead located within the
acreage he 1 lad pu rchased for Parcel 2

Measuring beyond t:.l: :ie

driveway, there was inadequate land between the driveway and the
southeastern boundary of the property to locate his home.
Bradshaws immediately advised Defendant Gregory or -ne ^rorlem
and Gregory contacted Defendant McNeil, (Transcript, p, 169, L.
20 - ,
36.

-

L. 14 - p

383, I i 4)

Defendant Gregory did not contact the Grahns

immediately about the mistake that had been discovered until
approximately one day after tl le closi rig on tl le Bradshaw property,
because until the closing the Defendant Gregory did not
understand the magnitude of the problem; it was at that time they
thought they understood the effect of tl le mi stake; a nd they
obtained counsel to get legal advice on what to do, Additionally,
Gregory felt that the Earnest Money Agreement he had signed with
Bradshaws was a legally binding contract, and that therefore he
had to go through with the closing. (Transcript, p

175,, L. 23 -

p. 177, L. 9)
37.

On the day after the closing with Bradshaws, Defendant

Gregory gave notice to Grahns of the error and offered possible
12

solutions to the problem created by the mistake.

(Exhibit 8-P of

Record)
38.

The Trial Court recognized that the Earnest Money

Agreement between Defendant Gregory and Bradshaws was a legal and
binding agreement. (Transcript, p. 176)
39.

On October 23, 1986, McNeil prepared a revised drawing

showing what he believed to be the relationship of the Private
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.
40.

(See Exhibit 9-P of Record)

Defendant McNeil subsequently prepared a revised survey

of both parcels, showing the correct boundaries.
19-D of Record)

(Note:

(See Exhibit

In Appellants' previous Brief, Fact No.

40, these Defendants erroneously referred to that survey as
Exhibit 12-P.)
41.

Addendum A attached to this brief is a copy of the

pertinent portion of Exhibit 1-P of the record, the original
survey prepared by McNeil, showing Parcel 2 and what the parties
believed was the nature of the property including the location of
the road at the time they entered into the agreement.

Only this

pertinent and relevant portion of the oversized exhibit has been
photocopied as Addendum "A" for this brief so that the Addendum
maintains the scale of the trial exhibit of 1 inch equals 20
feet.

Addendum B is a copy of the pertinent part of Exhibit 19-D

of the record, the revised survey, showing where the road is
actually located on the property.

Again, only this pertinent and

relevant part of the oversized exhibit has been photocopied as
Addendum B to maintain the same scale of 1 inch equals 20 feet as
13

shown on Exhibit 19-D at trial.

Zoning ordinances require a 30

foot front yard set back from the road and a 10 foot side yard
set back

Additionally, there is a 15 foot easement along the

Southeastern edge of the driveway which Gregory granted to
Grahns.

According to the zoning requirements, the 15-foot

easement and the revised survey, if the contract is reformed
pursuant to the District Court's ruling, the buildable space on
Parcel 2 is great 1 y reduced ai i ::i i s 1 ocat .ed on the steepest
terrain on Parcel 2.

(See Exh. 1-P and 19-D; Transcript p. 242,

L. 4-13)
42.

Addendum C I s a copy of page A-2 of Exh I bi t 18 D which

was the drawing made by Bradshaws' architect showing the
steepness of the slope of Parcel 2, the location of the slope in
Parcel 2 and where the home Bradshaws designed was to be located
on the property.
43.

(See Exh. 18-D)

Addenda D and E are full-sized copies of Exh ibits 1-P

and 19-D, respectively, of which Addenda A and B relevant parts,
respectively.
44.

Plaintiffs ".rah:; •; i ~> not. sei j thei: prior home until

March 1, 1987, which was three months after this lawsuit was
commenced.

(Transcript p. 116, L. 15-24)

They did not move into

the home oi i Parcel 1 until some sevei I months after this 1 aw su i t:
was filed, and most of the time and money they spent in repairing
and/or remodeling the home on Parcel 1 was spent after this
lawsuit

filed.

(Transcript, p. lis ;ii;

14

45.

Plaintiffs Grahn and Defendant Gregory had an informal

understanding that since Grahns had "gotten a good deal" on their
purchase of Parcel 1, and that if at a later time they could
purchase Parcel 2, Grahns were going to pay higher than value for
Parcel 2 to even things out in the long run.

(Transcript p. 125)

ARGUMENT
I
THERE WAS ONLY ONE MISTAKE MADE BY THE
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION - MISTAKEN
ASSUMPTIONS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS SURVEY
(In Reply to Point I of Respondents' Brief)
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn, in their brief, assert that
there were two distinct mistakes made by the parties, one mutual
and one unilateral.

The facts, however, clearly establish the

mistake in this transaction was a reliance placed on an erroneous
survey.

All parties relied on the survey which was erroneous and

as a result all parties to the transaction misunderstood the
nature of the property.

As a result of the mistaken survey, the

parties made a series of errors.

The Plaintiffs/Respondents

Grahn thought they were buying 1.11 acres which included a road.
The Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw thought they had at least a
half acre not including a road.

These were in fact

representations made by the Defendant/Appellant Gregory based
upon a survey he had previously obtained from Defendant McNeil.
The representations were flawed because the survey was flawed.
The legal description obtained by Grahns was flawed because the
survey was flawed because it didn't include the road.
15

The legal

description obtained by Bradshaws is flawed because it is
contradictory to the representation that it didn't inc] ode the
road.

Each of these facts is clearly established by the record.

The Addenda to this brief illustrates the effect the mistake
had upon the agreements the parties thought they were making*
Addendum A is a photocopy of the pertinent portion of the
original survey upon which all parties relied in making their
agreement.

The sea] e 01 1 tl le survey i s one inch equals twenty

feet, which has not been altered in the photocopy according to
the original survey.

To determine the full effect the mistake

had upon the agreed exchange of performance, the Court should
review the parties' intent with respect to Parcel A.
intended to sell the parcel as a buildable lot.

The parties

The Gregorys

intended the lot be separated from the 1.11 acre parcel to allow
Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the trust, to build a home.
That was the Gregorys intent when they requested the original
survey.

The Court should then review the buildable space of the

original survey and compare it with the buildable space of the
revised survey and the affect the Court's ruling would have on
the agreed exchange of performances under the Contracts and the
buildable space.
If the Court looked at Exhibit "A"r the original survey, and
drew lines which reflected the 30 foot set back from Brookburn
Road (the heavy black line at the bottom of the page), and a ten
foot set back on the side yard, and the 15 foot easement along
the southern edge of the drive way, which Gregory granted to
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Grahns, the Court could see the buildable space on the property
the parties thought they were buying and selling.

The lines

drawn, according to scale, would be one and one-half inches for
30 feet, three quarters of an inch for fifteen feet and one-half
inch for ten feet.
Addendum D is a photo of transparency copy of the revised
survey showing the actual location of the road with respect to
the legal description of the property.

Using the same zoning set

back and easement distances, the Court could also draw the lines
showing the buildable space on the property with respect to where
the road actually lies.

Because of the location of the road

being farther from the property line and because of the easement,
the Court can clearly see that if the trial court's ruling of
reformation is allowed to stand, the buildable space is
significantly reduced.

As well, the new parcel is no longer in

compliance with zoning requirements that require a minimum of a
half acre in order to construct a residence.
Addendum M C" shows the steepness of the slope and shows that
the slope is steepest in the buildable portion of the lot.

The

two parcels are, therefore, materially different and demonstrate
the drastic effect the mistake had on the agreements between the
parties.
The Trial Court found that 1.11 acres was the acreage which
both Grahns and Gregory accepted as that which the parties
intended to buy and sell.
534)

(Finding of Fact No. 13, Record, p.

The Earnest Money Agreement executed by Plaintiffs Grahn
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says Defendant Gregory was selling 1.11 acres.
Record)

(Exhibit 2-P of

This agreemei it was drafted by t .he Plaint:! ffs Grahn, so

they had to have understood this issue of fact.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Grahn had been informed of the way the
property had been divided according to the survey.

They were

shown the survey stakes which indicated the driveway as the
boundary between the two parcels as divided when surveyed.

They

were told, based on the survey, that Parcel 2 contained one-half
acre beyond the driveway and that Parcel 1 contained
approximately one acre i nc 1 ud I ng the • diri veway.

At that point,

the Defendant/Appellant's intentions, while relying on the
survey, also became the Grahns' intentions while relying on the
survey.

Mrs. Glial u I also testified she was relying on the survey.

Mrs. Grahn also testified she was relying on that survey, even
with the first offer they made. (Transcript, p. 9 4 , L.

8-13)

(Transcript, p. 97, L. 18-21)
Defendant/Appellant Gregory had instructed the surveyor,
Defendant McNeil, to divide off at least a half-acre using the
driveway as a boundary if possible.

The Defendant Gregory

intended Parcel 2 to have contained at least one-half acre
because the Trust believed it needed at least one-half acre to
comply with zoning ordinances and also that this was a minimum
for the parcel to be buildable. (Testimony of M r s . Danielson,
Transcript, p. 422, L. 20-23)

Defendant McNeil's sur vey si lowed

that he had attempted to do this and everyone innocently and
justifiably relied on the erroneous survey.
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Had the parties

known that the surveyor had made a mistake, the Defendant/
Appellant Gregory would not have divided the property.

The

Defendant/Appellant Gregory would not have made the agreement
with Grahns to divide the property and sell them Parcel 1
separately. (Testimony of Mr. Gregory, Transcript, p. 316, L. 517; Testimony of Mrs. Danielson, Transcript, p. 422, L. 10-23
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahns' brief states that the legal
description used by Grahns and Gregory at closing was mistaken.
(Brief of Respondent, p. 27)

In making this statement,

Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn cite the testimony of Mr. McNeil,
page 224, lines 17-21, pages 224-228. This testimony makes no
references to the legal description Grahns and Gregory used in
their contract.

Mr. McNeil is testifying about what he did after

he found out that he may have made a mistake in his survey.
Reformation is the remedy when the parties come to an
agreement, but there is a mistake made in the reducing that
agreement to writing or where it does not accurately reflect the
intentions of the parties.

But when the intentions themselves

were based on mistaken understandings about the subject matter,
there has been no meeting of minds.

EQUITY, Bobbs-Merrill

Company, Inc., 1954, 409. When there is no meeting of the minds,
the remedy of rescission is the appropriate remedy.
In reaching their agreement, these parties made assumptions
about the very way the land existed, based upon a survey.
assumptions were mistaken.

These

Defendant/Appellant Gregory made this

contract to sell Parcel 1 separately to the Plaintiffs/
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Respondents Grahn because they thought these assumptions to be
true.

It makes no difference whether the legal description they

used incorporated the surveyor's mistake.
was his mistake.

The surveyor's mistake

The mistake by the parties occurred when they

made their bargain based on this survey, not when they reduced it
to writing.

They made the assumptions innocently and

justifiably.

The contract between these parties should therefore

be voidable by either party cine to tl lat mutua I mistake.

The

equitable remedy of rescission makes that possible.
The Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn contend that there was also
a unilateral mistake - one made by Gregory in believing Parcel 2
to contain at least 1/2 acre, and contend that Parcel 2 in fact
contained less than 1/2 acre. (Brief of Respondents, p. 29)
Grahns assert that this was only a unilateral mistake because
Grahns were not concerned with the size of Parcel 2 and therefore
it was not a material feature to the contract as far as th»--y ••- --*
concerned.

However the Grahns drafted the Earnest Money

Agreement to divide the parcels based upon assumptions from the
survey.

They relied on the survey stakes in believing that the

survey created a one-acre parcel which was divided from a onehalf acre parcel.

They understood and intended that Parcel 1

contained 1.11 acres.

This is evidenced by the Earnest Money

Agreement that Grahns' attorney prepared and Grahns signed. They
also understood and intended that Parcel 2 a Dntained at 1 east
one-half acre.

That is evidenced by the testimony that they

discussed the "one-half acre parcel" and is also evidenced by the
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Earnest Money Agreement which mentions the "one-half acre parcel"
no less than five times in the right of first refusal portion
thereof.

Additionally, Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn intended, as

did Defendant Gregory, that the driveway be included on the
parcel they were buying.

Unbeknownst to either party, it was not

so because of the assumption based on an erroneous survey.
Where either party to a contract would be deprived of the
benefit of their bargain by reformation, the parties' agreement
is viewed as being founded on mutual mistake and without a
meeting of the minds.

Under those circumstances, rescission is

the appropriate remedy.
1987)

Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359 (Vt.

The Defendant/Appellant Gregory bargained with Grahns to

separate off a one-half acre parcel and to sell Grahns the larger
one-acre parcel.

Defendant/Appellant Gregory has established

that the Trust intended and agreed to divide and sell Parcel 1
separately to Grahns, knowing that Parcel 2 contained at least
one-half acre beyond the driveway.

Defendant/Appellant Gregory

is entitled to the rescission of that bargain because the Trial
Court's ruling of reformation would deprive Gregory of the
benefit of his bargain.
The Defendant/Appellant Gregory has established that he
always intended that Parcel 2 contain at least one-half acre
because of a zoning ordinance that required one-half acre of land
in order to build.

Further, Gregory has established that, had

Gregory known about the mistake, he would never have divided the
property. Even if it would be possible now to get a variance, it
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wasn't his intention to get a variance.

The Trial Court's

decision forces the parties into a contract which they did riot
intend to make had the parties been aware of the actual facts at
the time they entered into their agreements.
II
THERE HAS BEEN NO CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE
(In reply to additional Argument of Point I in
Respondents' Brief)
1.

The Trial Court found no evidence of a conspiracy.

Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn accepted the Trial Court's dismissal
of their claim against Defendant/Appellant Gregory for
conspiracy.

Yet, Plaintiffs/Respondents continue to bring the

subject of conspiracy into this lawsuit.
issue on appeal.

Conspiracy is not an

The Trial Court did not find that the

Defendant/Appellant had acted in bad faith because no one has.
It is true that the two Defendants/Appellants Gregory and
Bradshaw do not have a dispute with each other in this lawsuit.
Each believes that rescission is the proper remedy for this kind
of mistake.

That remedy would make each contract voidable.

Each

also believes that reformation was an improper remedy and
prejudiced both Defendants.
Defendant Gregory stands to be unjustly prejudiced if
reformation of the Grahns deed is allowed, because not only will
he lose the Bradshaws' contract since Bradshaws could no longer
build their house on that land, but also, by giving Grahns a
portion of Parcel 2, the size and value of Parcel 2 is
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substantially diminished.

Obviously this was not the intention

of the Defendant/Appellant Gregory when he divided the property
and agreed to sell Parcel 1 separately to Grahns.

The effect of

the Trial Court's decision therefore was to force the parties
into a contract they did not intend to make.
The Bradshaws would certainly be prejudiced by the Trial
Court's decision of reformation since they could no longer build
the house they planned on Parcel 2.

They would have to either

rescind their contract with Gregory, or ifi, they could obtain a
variance, go through designing another, much smaller house.

They

would then suffer loss of all the money and time they incurred in
designing their home before the surveyor's mistake was
discovered.
It is true that the Defendants' attorneys are now members of
the same law firm.

This was not true when this litigation was

filed and tried; however, since then, Mr. Walker has joined Mr.
Woodbury's firm.

At the time Mr. Walker joined the firm, the two

attorneys met regarding a possible conflict of interests and
obtained the consent and agreement from their respective clients
to proceed.

Both the Defendant Gregory and Defendants Bradshaw

feel they have been prejudiced by the Trial Court's decision to
reform the Grahns deed and thus both are working toward the same
goal - reversal of that decision.
Finally, the rules of this Court provide that attorneys for
separate appellants may work together, adopting by reference any
part of the other's brief, or joining in a brief.
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(Rule 24(i),

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals)
These parties are not conspiring against anyone.

The

attorneys are working together to save time, money, and
repetition.

Further, it is not the intention of the Defendant

Gregory that Plaintiffs Grahn lose the property they purchased.
It is solely his endeavor to have an equitable outcome in this
lawsuit by having the Defendants Bradshaw and Plaintiffs Grahn
agree to a new boundary or have the right to rescind and get
their money back.
Ill
REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
(In Reply to Section II of Respondents' Brief)
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn cite to various treatises
regarding equitable remedies in an effort to distinguish between
rescission and reformation.

Defendant Gregory addressed this

distinction in his previous brief at pages 1 9 - 2 7 .

We will not

repeat Defendant Gregory's argument regarding the distinction,
but reassert the same, and only wish to add that in the treatise,
EQUITY, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1954, which Grahns cite in
support of their position, the author states in a footnote at
page 409, "A mistake which justifies reformation is one that
occurs not in the bargain itself but subsequent to the bargain;
it is a mistake in reducing to writing the contract of the
parties", (citing 60 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 589). The parties to this
contract made mistakes as to their assumptions and understanding
of the nature of the subject matter of the contract while they
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were making their bargain, long before reducing it tc writing,
which if known, would likely have prevented the contract.
IV
THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION IS APPROPRIATE
(In Reply to Point III of Respondents' Brief)
The Plaintiffs Grahn argues that Defendant Gregory is not
entitled to rescission because the Defendant Gregory did not act
promptly to unequivocally announce his intention to rescind the
contract. (Brief of Respondent, p. 37)

Defendant Gregory did, in

fact, act as promptly as these facts permitted.

First, Defendant

Gregory sought professional advise to help him understand the
problem.
property.

Gregory needed to have McNeil survey and analyze the
The property had to be resurveyed and analyzed.

Next

Defendant Gregory attempted to work out a solution to the
problem, to redraw the boundary line whereby (1) Grahns could
keep the 1.1-acre parcel they had purchased, (2) Grahns could
still have a driveway for ingress and egress, and (3) Parcel 2
would still contain one-half acre as intended.

Therefore,

instead of informing Grahns that he was rescinding the contract,
he offered to move the driveway onto the Grahns' property
himself, or allow Grahns to rescind and get their money back.
The remedy of rescission only makes the contract
voidable by the adversely affected party.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS, Section 152 states:
When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract
Avoidable.
1.

Where a mistake of both parties at the time a
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contract was made as to a basic assumption on
which the contract was made has a material effect
on the agreed exchange of performances, the
contract is voidable by the adversely affected
party unless he bears the risk of the mistake
under the rules stated in Section 154.
In the comments of Section 152, the remedy of rescission is
broken down into three basic elements.
1.

The mistake must relate to a "basic assumption on which

the contract was made".
2.

The party seeking avoidance must show that the mistake

has a material effect upon the agreed exchange of performances.
3.

The mistake must not be one as to which the party

seeking relief bears the risk.
In this case, the mistake of the parties did relate to a
basic assumption on which the contract was made - the nature and
existence of the land itself.

Gregory has shown that the

mistaken assumptions the parties made had a material effect upon
the agreed performances.

Neither party would have likely made

the contract had the mistaken assumptions not been made.

At no

time in contracting for the sale of the property did the
Defendant Gregory assume or bear the risk.
relying on the survey to be correct.

He was justified in

In fact, according to the

Earnest Money Agreement, the buyers bore the risk of error in
size or location.
If this Court finds that rescission is the proper remedy and
the contract is therefore made voidable, it will be up to Grahns
to "elect to rescind and unequivocally announce their intention
to rescind the contract" if they wish to do so instead of
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specifically performing on their deed and moving the driveway
themselves.
IN ADDITION EVEN IF THE MISTAKE WAS UNILATERAL, DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT GREGORY MET THE ELEMENTS FOR RESCISSION BASED ON
UNILATERAL MISTAKE.
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985) sets forth the
elements for rescission based on unilateral mistake.
1.

The mistake was so grave as to make enforcing it

unconscionable.
2.

The matter as to which the mistake was made related to a

material feature.
3.

The mistake occurred notwithstanding the exercise of

ordinary diligence by the Trust.
4.

It is possible to give relief by way of rescission

without serious prejudice to either party except the loss of
their bargain.
A mistake that, if known, would have prevented the contract
altogether is grave enough to make the contract unconscionable.
In this case, the Defendant Gregory provided through testimony
that had he known of the mistake in the survey, he wouldn't have
divided the property.

The division of the property technically

subdivides the property in violation of the current zoning
ordinances.

Although a variance may be permitted, the lot shape

and configuration, the topography and dense foliage make the
practical salability of the half acre parcel a remote possibility
and at a diminished price.
A mistake is material if the mistaken feature is known is
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grave enough to have prevented the contract in the first place.
The Plaintiffs Grahn has argued the size of the parcel was
immaterial to them in purchasing the property.

However, it was

their contract, the Earnest Money Agreement, which denotes
specific acreage amounts in no less than seven different places.
They were clearly aware of the half acre zoning regulations or
they wouldn't have notified the Bradshaws of the subdivision
problems.

Defendant Gregory certainly wouldn't have agreed to

sell the Grahns the 1.11 acre parcel had he know it would have
effectively rendered the remaining parcel unbuildable.

The

mistaken assumption now known is contrary to all Gregory's
intentions when he divided the property.
The remedy of rescission for unilateral mistake is not
available to a party who made a mistake due to his own
negligence.

In this case, the Defendant/Appellant Gregory did

act with ordinary diligence.

The Defendant Gregory, as well as

the Plaintiffs Grahn, were mistaken and unknowingly relied upon
an erroneous survey when they contracted to buy and sell Parcel
1.

Each exercised ordinary diligence in relying on that survey.

An ordinary lay person who is not a surveyor would not be
expected to question the correctness of a survey.

The Plaintiffs

make reference again to the conspiracy against this portion of
their brief in which they allege that the Defendant Gregory does
not have clean hands.

It is true that some time passed between

the initial discovery of the problem, and the time the Grahns
were informed of the problem.

However the delay was caused by
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Defendant Gregory's failure to understand the problem and not as
a result of any conspiracy.
Plaintiffs Grahn allege that they cannot be put back into
status quo because they had "sold their prior home, had put at
least $10,000.00 of improvements into the property, and most
importantly, had put over 1600 hours of their time into the
property." (Brief of Respondent, p. 51)

Plaintiff Josephine

Grahn herself testified that they did not sell their prior home
until March 1, 1987, which was three months after this lawsuit
was commenced. (Transcript p. 116, L. 15-24) She further
testified that they did not move into the home on Parcel 1 until
some 7 months after this lawsuit was filed, and that most of the
time and money they spent on the property was spent after this
lawsuit was filed.

(Transcript p. 115-116)

These Defendants

maintain that Plaintiffs/Respondents had a duty to mitigate their
damages, had no losses prior to Grahns' discovery of the mistake,
and therefore would not be seriously prejudiced by rescission
except for the loss of their bargain.
Plaintiffs' attorney in his brief accuses that Defendants
"push, twist and turn their version of the facts in an attempt to
make it fit the law of rescission, in the same manner that the
Ugly Sisters, in the story of Cinderella, attempted to fit their
feet into the glass slipper." (Brief of Respondent, p. 52)

The

Defendants/Appellants and their attorneys believe that the
Plaintiffs/Respondents' attorney, as a professional and officer
of this Court, owes them and this Court more respect than to make
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such a statement in a legal brief.

Obviously, in any lawsuit,

the facts of the case are going to be viewed differently by the
two sides.

Otherwise, there would be no dispute.

These

Defendants believe their facts to be consistent with the record
in this case, have not attempted to twist anything, and leave the
decision with this Court as to whether the facts they have
represented are consistent with the record.
V.
REFORMATION IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
(In Reply to Point IV of Respondents' Brief)
The case of Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359 (Vt. 1987) was
one that involved multiple parcels of land being conveyed in one
transaction.

The Supreme Court of Vermont in that case held that

the case be remanded to determine the effect of a proven nineacre deficiency in one parcel after reformation.

The Court

stated that if the deficiency could be satisfied from other
acres, and if the Lajoies could still receive one hundred sixty
tillable acres, which was the number of acres on their deed, then
the deed could be reformed.
If, however, reformation would result in the Lajoies
receiving less than one hundred sixty tillable acres,
then the deed should be rescinded. Where either party
would be deprived of the benefit of their bargain by
reformation, the parties' agreement is viewed as being
founded on mutual mistake and without a meeting of the
minds. Under such circumstances, rescission is the
appropriate remedy... .
(Id. at p. 363, citations omitted)
In the present case, the Defendant Trust bargained with
Grahns to divide the existing property into two parcels, using
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the same survey that had been used when the property was
previously divided.

They bargained to sell Grahns Parcel 1

separately since they could not afford the entire property.
Defendants have established that their intention, in agreeing to
sell that parcel to Grahns separately, was to leave Parcel 2 in
tact as they understood it to exist, based upon the existing
survey which showed it to contain .56 acres, beyond the driveway.
If reformation is allowed in this case, the Trust will lose a
portion of the acreage it had on Parcel 2, diminishing its size,
value, buildability, and marketability, thereby losing the
benefit of its bargain.
VI.
THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS WERE MERGED INTO
THE DEED BECAUSE THE PARTIES MADE THEIR MISTAKES
ABOUT THE NATURE OP THE PROPERTY DURING THEIR
BARGAINING NOT WHILE REDUCING THEIR BARGAIN TO WRITING
(In Reply to Point V of Respondents' Brief)
The Defendant Gregory agrees with the Trial Court's finding
that the description of Parcel 1 designated Parcel 1 as being
1.11 acres and was accepted by the parties as acreage to be sold
and purchased.
The Trial Court's findings of fact states:
13. The description to Parcel One was
obtained by plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt
Lake County Recorders Office. The
description designated Parcel One as being
1.11 acres and accepted by the trustee and
defendants Grahn as acreage to be sold and
purchased.
(Findings and Conclusions,
Record, p. 534)
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Whether the Court meant for the word "accepted" to be active
or passive, it seems clear that he was simply saying that 1.11
acres of land was the amount of acreage that the Defendant
Gregory and Grahns agreed upon to be bought and sold.

These

Defendants take the position that the Court meant by that finding
that 1.11 acres was the amount of acreage conveyed.
VII.
THE DEED WAS CLEAR, AND EVEN IP IT COULD BE POUND TO BE
UNCLEAR, THE PAROL EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE DEED REFLECTED
BOTH THE PLAINTIFFS' AND THE DEFENDANTS' INTENT
(In Reply to Point VI of Respondents' Brief)
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that parol evidence is
allowed to show intent when the deed is unclear as to what is
being conveyed.

Neelev v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979 (Utah 1979).

The deed between Grahns and Gregory was clear.

The

description stated 1.11 acres was being conveyed and contained no
reference to the road.

The deed was clear to the Trial Court.

He found that 1.11 acres was the amount of land the parties
understood was being conveyed.

Since the deed is clear, parol

evidence should not have been allowed.
Even if the deed is found to be unclear, the parol evidence
the Court should look at is the contract (Earnest Money
Agreement) between the parties and the conversations which took
place when Grahns looked at the property and when the parties
were negotiating their contract.
The Earnest Money Agreement shows 1.11 acres intended and
contains the words "one-half acre" parcel several times in
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referring to Parcel 2 in the option for right of first refusal.
The contract therefore showed Gregory's intent to convey 1.11
acres to Grahns, reserving a one-half acre parcel on Parcel 2.
Plaintiffs/Respondents prepared the contract.

Therefore, any

mistake should be construed against the scrivener of that
document and therefore, it should be construed against
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn.
When Grahns walked the property with Mr. Taylor, Gregory's
agent, he informed them that the property could be divided as
staked by the surveyor, into a one-acre and a one-half acre
parcel and that Grahns could either purchase the entire piece, or
could just buy the one acre parcel.

Mrs. Grahn testified that

the division of the property was something they were conscious of
because they could not afford the whole piece.
Both parties testified that they relied on Mr. McNeil's
survey in contracting to sell Parcel 1 separately to Grahns.
The parol evidence then shows that the intent of the parties
was to convey exactly what they did convey by deed, and that they
made a mutual mistake in relying on the survey, which if they had
known was erroneous, would have prevented the formation of the
contract.
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VIII
IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR RESPONDENTS, IN THEIR BRIEF,
TO REASSERT THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL
OF BRADSHAWS' APPEAL WHEN THEY HAVE ALREADY
MADE THEIR MOTION AND IT HAS BEEN DENIED.
(In reply to Point VII of Respondents' Brief)
The Plaintiffs have previously filed and argued their Motion
to Dismiss Bradshaws' appeal in this matter.
their Motion.

This Court denied

It is inappropriate for Plaintiffs to now use

their responsive brief to again assert this argument.

After

having received one stipulated extension of time to file their
brief, Plaintiffs received, ex parte, additional time to file
their brief so that they could file their Motion to Dismiss.
They filed that Motion.

It was denied.

If they were going to

make the motion in their brief, these Defendants wonder why they
asked the Court for more time to file it.
IX
BRADSHAWS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
AND THEREFORE CUT OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO REFORMATION
(In reply to Point VIII of Respondents' Brief)
Defendant Gregory supports the argument set forth in the
Bradshaw brief, and add the following:

The Bradshaws were bona

fide purchasers because they entered into and executed their
Earnest Money Agreement with Defendant Gregory to purchase Parcel
2

before any mistakes or mistaken assumptions were discovered.

The Trial Court recognized that their Earnest Money Agreement was
a legally binding contract.
23).

(See Transcript, page 176, line 19-

However, the Trial Court then made a finding that Bradshaws
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were not bona fide purchasers, without elaborating on his reason
for that finding.

These Defendants submit that the Court erred

in finding the Bradshaws not to be bona fide purchasers, which
cut off Plaintiffs' right to reformation.

In this case,

Bradshaws had no notice of any mistake when they entered into
their contract with Defendant Gregory, nor did they have any
notice of any interest the Grahns claimed in Parcel 2.

Grahns

did not acquire that interest until the Trial Court ordered
reformation of their deed to add the disputed property.
Bradshaws" bona fide status arose when they signed their Earnest
Money offer to purchase Parcel Two.

For Gregory to have refused

to close on the property would have been a breach of contract.
CONCLUSION
The Grahns purchased and the Defendant Gregory sold to
Grahns a 1.11 acre parcel of land.

Whether Grahns were concerned

with the amount of acreage or not, that was the amount they
purchased.

The parties believed and intended for the driveway to

be located within the perimeters of the 1.11 acre parcel being
conveyed to Grahns.

All the parties based this belief and

intention upon an erroneous survey.

The parties also understood

and agreed upon the division of the property into a one-acre lot
a and one-half acre lot, with the one-half acre lot being
situated in its entirety southeast of the driveway.

This was

also an erroneous assumption the parties made based upon the
existing erroneous survey.

These assumptions were the mistake

the parties made in this case - mutually mistaken assumptions
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based upon the way the land existed.

Had the parties understood

that the driveway could not be located on Parcel 1 and still
leave Parcel 2 at the acreage they understood it to contain, they
would not have made the bargain to separate the property and sell
Parcel 1 separately to Grahns.
They made their mistaken assumptions while bargaining, not
while reducing their contract to writing.

The contract reflected

their intentions to convey a certain amount of acreage.
conveyed that amount.

They

But assumptions they made and intentions

they had while bargaining were based upon mistaken information
they extrapolated from the existing survey upon which all parties
relied.
Even if it could be construed that because of the Grahns'
lack of concern about the amount of acreage, the mistake was
solely Defendant's, they are still entitled to rescission based
upon unilateral mistake.
The Defendant Gregory did not act to rescind the contract
because they wanted to work out a solution to the problem whereby
the Grahns could keep the acreage which they had purchased, still
have a driveway, and still leave at least one-half acre on Parcel
2 as intended.

Defendant Gregory's proposal of moving the

driveway onto Grahns' parcel would have achieved this solution.
The Beneficiaries of the Trust have been deprived of their
bargain by reformation, since they obviously would not have
contracted to convey all of Parcel 1 and part of Parcel 2 to
Grahns.

Reformation is only appropriate when the bargain is left
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in tact, but the writing is reformed to reflect the intentions of
the parties.
Since the mistake of the parties was made during their
bargaining and not in reducing their bargain to writing, the
contract provisions did merge into the deed.
The Plaintiffs are appealing the Court's decision to have
them pay for the extra property.
paid for it.

They say that they have already

Yet in her testimony, Mrs. Grahn admitted that it

was an informal understanding between the Grahns and Gregory that
Grahns felt they had "gotten a good deal" on their purchase of
Parcel 1, and that if at a later time they could purchase Parcel
2, they were going to pay higher than value for Parcel 2 to even
things out in the long run.

(Testimony of Mrs. Grahn,

Transcript, p. 125)
Defendant/Appellant Gregory hereby respectfully requests
that this Court find in favor of the Defendant ordering a
rescission of all contracts, so that Defendant Gregory can start
over and make new contracts based on correct assumption.
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tWoodbury
sy for
:endant/Appellant Gregory
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Allen Sims, Esq.
ALLEN SIMS, P,C.
8 East Broadway, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Russell S. Walker
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

T9

-f<rr Hjr

PA jz cere 1
os6 Aczes)

/

> '

'/

3£T

*T«M

JT.

S-

/

>

'

> '

' /

'

'

v

•'

/

'

' / '

' / '
"

CM

A * 48' rr
'.C . 66.19°

sr

<0
O
CM

O
(0

Oil

col

IE
O

PARCEL 2
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF OVERALL PARCEL:
Commencing 25 rods South and 942 feet East from the North
west corner of Section 35 9 Township 1 South, Range 1 East
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 5,58
feet; thence South 220 feet more or less to the center of
Mill Creek; thence Easterly and Southeasterly along said
creek 130 feet more or less; thence East 53 feet; thence
South 37 feet; thence West 53 feet; thence South 187 feet
more or less to Bennion Tract; thence West 14.52 rods; th
North 355 feet more or less to center of Mill Creek; then
Southeasterly along said center line to a point South fro
the point of beginning; thence North 220 feet more or les
to point of beginning.
Contains 1.67 acre.
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SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF PARCEL 01:
BEGINNING at a point on the North boundary line of Brookbuni Road, said point being 930.76
feet South and 1064.58 feet East from the Northwest corner of Section 35, Township 1 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 137,455 feet; thence
North 84.77 feet to the Easterly side of an existing driveway} thence along the Easterly side
of said driveway the following three courses: Northeasterly along the arc of a 105*00 foot
radius curve to the left (center bears North 13°16,30,f West 88.815 feet to the point of tangency;
North 28°15ff29" East 49.55 feet to the point of curvature of a 78.00 foot radius curve to
the left; and Northerly along the arc of said curve 38.47 feet to the point of tangency;
thence North 64.60 feet to the center line of Mill Creek; thence along said center line South
62°57 f 48 H East 40.78 feet and North 59 0 16 f l4 M East 61.65 feet; thence South 58.5 feet to the
center line of an existing irrigation ditch; thence along said center line North 85°41,024f
West 53.15 feet; thence South 241.0? feet to the point of beginning.
Contains 0.56 acres.

LEGAL DESCRIPTION FOR PARCEL ALONG BROOKBURN ROAD TO BE QUITCLAIM! D BY I 0k H I
TO ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST:

C. BENNION

BEGINNING at a point 921.32 feet South and 825 teet East from the Northwest corner of
Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence East 239.58 feet; thence South 10.00 feet; thence West 239.58 feet; thence North
10.00 feet to the point of beginning.

I, Scott F. McNeil, do hereby certify that I am a duly registered land surveyor holding
license no. 4099 according to the rules and regulations of the State of Utah and that
I surveyed the above described parcel of land. I further certify that the accompanying
sketch is a true and accurate representation of the property surveyed showing the
improvements, etc., that effect the location of the property lints,
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MR. & MRS. HEROLD GREGORY
2811 BROOKBURN ROAD (3535 South)
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF OVERALL PARCEL;
Commencing 25 rods South and 942 feet East * from the Northwest
corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, and running thence East 5.58 feet; thence
South 220 feet, more or less, to the center of Mill Creek; thence
Easterly and Southeasterly along said creek 130 feet, more t or
less; .thence East 53 feet; thence South 31 feet; thence West*53
feet*; thence South 187 feet, more or less, to Bennion Tract;
thence West 14.52 rods; thence North 355 feet, more or less, to
center of Mill Creek; thence Southeasterly along said center line
to a point South from the point of beginning; thence North 220
feet, more or less, to the point of beginnixjg.
Contains 1.67 acres.
DEED DESCRIPTION OF PARCEL 1;
r

Beginning 25 Rods South and 942 feet East from the Northwest
corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, $alt Lake
Base and Meridian; East 5.58 feet; South 220 feet, more or less
to the center of Mill Creek; Easterly and Southeasterly along
said creek 89.22 feet; South 64.6 feet to a point of curvature;
thence Southerly alopg curve ^to a right radius 78.00 feet, 38.45
feet, to a point of tangency; thence South 280i5t29* West 49,55
feet to 'a point of curvature; thence Southwesterly along curve to.
a right radius 105.00 feet, 88*815*feet; thence South~94.77 feet;
thence West 102.125 feet; thence .North 355 feet, more or less, to
the center of Mill Creek; thence Southeasterly along said center
line to a point South from the beginning; thence North 22p feet,
more or less, to beginning*

SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF PARCEL 1:>
Beginning at a point 412.50 feet South and 942,00 feet East from
the Northwest corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 5.5B
feet; thence South 202.73 feet to the center^ of Mill Creek;
thence Easterly along the center of said Creek the following two
, courses: North 87002*23" East 15,22 feet and South 80O06f30"
East 66*46 feet; thence South 86.95 feet to the point of curvature of a 78.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence along
the arc of said 78.00 foot radius foot curve 38.47 feet to the
point of tangency; thence South 28015'39M West 49»55 feet to the
point of curvature of a 105.00 foot radius curve to the right;
thence along the arc of said 105.00 foot radius curve 88.815
feet; 'thence .South 84.90 feet to th*» Nn-rt-h Mim^artr n~« ~*

v&

Creek; thence North 87O02 , 23 ft East along said center of Mill
Creak 117.16 feet; thence North 203,01 feet" to the point of.
beginning. Contains 1.19 acres.

3R00KBURN SUB'D
SURVEY DESCRIPTION OP PARCEL 2;
Beginning at a point on the North boundary line of Brookburn ?
Road, said point being 930.76 feet South and 1064.58 feet East
from the Northwest corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range
1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 4
137.455 feet; thence North 84.90 feet to a point on a 105.00 foot
radius curve to the left (center bears North ISoie'SO" W * ^ } ;
thence along the arc of said 105.00 foot radius curve 88.815 feet
to the point of tangency; thence North 28oi5 l 39" East 49.55 feet
to the point of curvature of a 78.00 foot radius curve to the
left; thence Northerly along the arc of said 78.00 foot radius
curve 38.47 feet to the point of tangency; {fhence North 86.95
feet to the center of Mill Creek; thence along the said center of
Mill Creek the following three courses:
South 22052 , 21" East
49.12 feet, South 66O00 f 14" East 41,82 feet, and North 56oi3'48 H
East 38.50 feet*: thence South 58.50 feet to the centerline of an
existing irrigation ditch; thence North 88043 , 28 ,f West along said
centerline 52.99 feet; thence South 206.72 feet to the point of
beginning.
Contains .57 acres.

I, Scott F. McNeil, do hereby certify that I am 'a duly registered
Land Surveyor holding license no. 4099 according to the rules and
regulations of the State of Utah, and that I surveyed the above
described parcels of land.
I further certify that the accompanying sketch Is a true and
accurate representation of the properties surveyed, showing fence
lines and improvements effecting the boundary lines of these
properties.

v//»/j T 3
Date

x

e>7
Scott F. McNeil, P.E. & L.S.
License No. 4099

527.825'

-y
N 36' 31' 10" W

94.745'

1 DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

/9-cL
S.L. CO. MONUMENT

1 DRAWN BY*T*&

SHEET DISCRETION'

SHEET NO

£

ICHECKED BY« >^M^ J
I

DATE'

'/z/S7

JOB NO' 8 4 I J I

'BOUNDARY SURVEY
OF

Okie.

